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Like many others who had followed the Danish debate on human rights, I shivered when I
first saw Danish Minister of Justice, Søren Pape Poulsen, on April 12th triumphantly
declaring his victory over the European Convention on Human Rights. He insinuated that
the Draft Copenhagen Declaration the Ministry had published in February, had been
accepted without major revisions. Of course, much is in the eye of the beholder, and Pape
may well feel that way, but in reviewing the declaration some of my worry evaporated.
Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein of the Pluricourts Center at Oslo University have
indeed argued convincingly that it would appear that the court has retained its
independence and the declaration is in fact much ado about little.
This leaves several questions of why. Why did Denmark, traditionally a frontrunner country,
create a draft declaration so regressive it gave rise to harsh critiques from the Council of
Europe Assembly, from academia in the form of the blogpost series at echrblog, at
EJILtalk, at Strasbourg observers, the pluricourts center, and of course verfassungsblog,
and civil society in their joint response? Even the court itself responded although not with
much fire nor fury. Why is the Minister glossing over the content of the declaration? Why
has the Danish Institute of Human Rights been so relatively quiet throughout the whole
debacle? – All we got in February was this short note that probably everything is a-okay. Is
there something rotten in the state of Denmark?
Human rights – a democratic challenge?
The Copenhagen declaration has given considerable weight to the importance of national
human rights institutions, they must be established (art. 18) and they will help implementing
the convention at the national level (art. 14). The discourse that lead Denmark on the path
to the rather embarrassing draft Copenhagen declaration started at such a national human
rights institution in 2014. That year, the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights,
Jonas Christoffersen, published a (well-meaning?) little booklet entitled “Human Rights – a
Democratic Challenge”.
The book was written in an easy to read language – later coined by head of the Department
of Justice, Rasmus Kieffer, as a PIXI book on human rights – great for politicians with their
short attention spans. The content of the book was not quite as adorable. Following a
rather dull but informative historical account of the establishment of the interpretation
tradition of the court, the book fell into a reductionist critique of European human rights
jurisdiction as inherently undemocratic:
”Defining the scope of human rights should not be the task of the courts. The elected
representatives must take responsibility for the formulation and prioritization of basic societal
values, because this provides the best democratic support for the decisions.” (page 84 – my
translation).
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He also rejected the universality of human rights:
”Can we – hand on heart – really believe that we can – on a global scale – define one common
set of norms that can muster support worldwide? Of course we cannot, and we should not
believe that this is the only option” (p. 25 – my translation).
Legitimising a far-right narrative
Why does it matter what the director of the Danish Institute for Human Rights wrote in a
non-peer-reviewed book from 2014, which did not gain popularity enough to warrant a
second printing? The narrative he presents is not a particularly new one – not even in
2014. It has been around on the far-right for a very long time.
It matters because Jonas Christoffersen is an established authority in the Danish legal field.
A large number of the annotated laws taught at the Danish law faculties are annotated by
him, and his position as head of the human rights institute also lends him legitimacy. For a
lot of Danes, the fact that this one man rejected notions of natural law and the universality
of human rights in the name of democracy meant that maybe, just maybe, the rightwing
populists were right all along.
However well-meaning – and who doesn’t want to defend democracy – his critique is
flawed. It is reductionist in time, geography and institutions; claiming that the European
Convention on Human Rights and its court are outdated in their approach, far away from
the people and created with an inherent democratic deficit because the judges are not
elected. Conveniently forgetting that the fundamental principle of equality before the law is
the foundation for any democratic system in both positive and natural law understandings,
as well as the fact that for far too many Europeans, the ECtHR is not a subsidiary to
national courts safety net for human rights violations, but the only safety net. The current
pressure on the ICC should also serve as a reminder that an international court that doesn’t
judge western states often or at all, will lose legitimacy in the South and East. The
foundation for the legitimacy of the ECtHR is exactly that it does not weigh how ‘advanced’
it deems a given judicial system to be but applies the interpretation principles including the
margin of appreciation equally to all member states.
Christoffersen’s critique was followed by academic work by several prominent Danish legal
scholars, furthering and building upon the narrative – though interestingly enough only
published in Danish. For example, Mads Bryde Andersen (Juristen 2017 no 3) wrote a
piece on how the interpretation tradition at the ECtHR compromised legal certainty, and the
thing for Denmark to do, would be to abolish the incorporation law that makes the ECHR
part of Danish law. Politicians from nearly all major parties followed suit, the nationalist-
conservative Danish People’s Party, the Liberal Party currently in government, and the
largest opposition party, the Social Democrats, each had their think-pieces on the
democratic deficit inherent in international judicial control, particularly one with a slightly
different interpretation tradition than the specific brand of Nordic legal realism used in
Denmark.
The establishment of a task force
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This coalition government currently in power has a critical reform of the European
Convention on Human Rights as part of their coalition agreement. In 2016 following a
parliamentary debate (Question 181) they set down a task force in the Ministry of Justice
with the purpose of “challenging the dynamic interpretation tradition at the ECtHR” (Minister
of Justice November 2016).
In an interesting turn of events, the task force was established under the Ministry of Justice
rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as is traditional. According to former Danish
ambassador to the Council of Europe, Claus von Barnekow, knowing this is central to
understanding why the draft declaration turned out as it did. The Ministry of Justice is
profoundly national in their expertise, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs unsurprisingly
has a more international outlook. In terms of political motivation, this means that the draft
declaration created by the Ministry of Justice caters to the national electorate, more than to
international cooperation.
From draft to declaration
As already noted by Antoine Buyse, the publication of the draft declaration, despite its
content, is a major democratic innovation as similar debates on the Brighton declaration
could only begin after the document was leaked. Anyone who could make it through the
nine page draft was potentially a stakeholder with a voice to be heard, and many voices
were heard between February and April. Despite this openness around the draft
declaration, the live tweets (#cphECHR) from the meeting of the Committee of Ministers,
which adopted the final declaration, appear undramatic. Somewhere in between the
drafting and the meeting, the final text was agreed upon by the negotiating parties, and it is
unknown to us which interventions from countries, civil society or academia were the ones
that made the decisive difference.
In a comparative analysis of what was scrapped from draft to declaration, the first thing I
noticed was the language. The language in the draft declaration, perhaps because it caters
to national interests rather than international ones, was accusatory, frequently passive-
aggressive and often lacked the universality and neutrality that characterizes international
treaties, conventions and declarations. A clear example of this is the draft’s art. 16 (art. 12
in the final version) on national implementation.
The first difference: where the final declaration talks about ineffective national
implementation, the draft talks about inadequate national implementation. The difference
may appear small, but the fact that it was changed speaks volumes. Inadequate has more
negative connotations than ineffective. Ineffective suggests that the ECHR relies on the
presumption principle. If a state has not implemented the convention thoroughly, it must be
because of some technical problem. The same kind of language can be found in the court’s
text on the pilot judgement procedures. The next major language difference is that the
qualifier ‘in some states’ in …systemic and structural human rights problems in some states
remains among the principal challenges… has disappeared from the final declaration. The
Council of Europe does not do with dividing language and non-universal application.
Of the more major changes that have also affected the legal meaning of the declaration,
the language of subsidiarity is worth noting. Where the draft declaration talks about
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securing human rights at the national level as the ‘natural step in the evolution of the
convention system’ and ‘bringing human rights home’ (draft dcl. 10) the final declaration
does not include this progression narrative, but simply notes that the court has created a
body of case law and the states have increasingly incorporated the convention, and these
are good steps for ensuring protection at the national level (art. 8).
Another place we can see the change from the draft declaration’s understanding of
subsidiarity as a right for states and margin of appreciation as an obligation of state
sovereignty to the final declaration’s understanding of subsidiarity as a way to ensure rapid
and fuller human rights protection, is in the declaration’s article 10 (draft art 12, 13, 14).
Here the final declaration reiterates that strengthening the principle of subsidiarity is not
intended to limit or weaken human rights protection but rather will increase ownership and
support for human rights. The draft declaration was very different, noting that dealing with
large numbers of cases internationally is unrealistic (13) and had localizing language
claiming human rights should be protected by national authorities in accordance with their
constitutional traditions and national circumstances (14).
Something rotten?
Inevitably this leaves us in position where certainly there is something rotten in the state of
Denmark, unsurprisingly given the current populist trend in all of Europe. There has been a
strong discourse of sovereignty and democratic deficit in the Danish debate on human
rights, but eventually after reaching an agreement with 47 other democratic states, the
Copenhagen declaration does not reflect this to the same degree.
In Denmark most of the debate has concerned a single case about the criminal Gimi
Levakovic who was not expelled from the country at his latest trial. It was the Danish
Supreme Court that decided not to expel Levakovic both because he had never set foot in
Croatia despite his Croatian citizenship but had lived forty years in Denmark, and because
he had underaged children in Denmark entitled to their right to family life under article 8.
Furthermore, the prosecutor had not earlier claimed expulsion. Legally an undramatic and
rather simple case – but politically a very explosive one. Levakovic had had his own reality
show on national television displaying his criminal life style, which made the case a public
one with many people rooting to have him leave the country for good.
Despite the fact that it was the Danish Supreme Court that issued the decision not to expel,
not the ECtHR, the Minister of Justice has repeatedly, almost as a bon mot or magic spell,
claimed that his main reason for wanting to reform the ECtHR was to keep the ECtHR from
preventing Danish court from expelling criminal foreigners. The narrative is a strong one in
the Danish public, and I for one can breathe again knowing that the 46 other democracies
kept Denmark from dismantling the independence of the ECtHR to follow this ill-advised
and populist obsession with expelling foreigners and furthering political control with the
court.
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